Time to streamline anti-Naxal ops

Two Central ministries, ministry of defence (MoD) and ministry of home affairs (MHA), are engaged in a nasty war of words over an incident involving Indian Air Force personnel during an anti-Maoist operation in Chhattisgarh.

An IAF Mi-17 that was providing logistical support to the police was brought down by Naxal fire. The MHA lashed out at the “cowardice” of the IAF personnel who, reportedly chose to abandon the machine and the wounded man where the chopper landed and flee to the nearest camp. The rescue party and reinforcements reached the spot three hours later.

The IAF also came under fire because its personnel did not bother to leave behind its commandos to guard the chopper and the injured cop — leaving the machine and its load of weapons unguarded in the Naxal-infested territory for three long hours.

The Air Force, in its defence, said the blame lay on the state’s police which did not ‘sanitise’ the area near their camp.

While the blame game continues and respective departmental inquiries are on, the uncomfortable issue of (and the ambiguity regarding) the role of the armed forces in anti-Naxal operations has raised its head.

The MoD had earlier declared that its personnel (read IAF) can return fire if fired upon by the Maoists guerrillas. It has not emerged clearly why the armed helicopter, with highly trained commandos on board, could not respond to the attack and went down.

The IAF personnel, before scramming, left an LMG and a pistol with the wounded policeman — how noble!

May be, in that condition, he was supposed to do a Rambo and mow down any possible Naxal assault team.

Now, imagine a scenario if the chopper crew had decided to hold their position. No matter what their training, the sheer numerical superiority of a Naxal party would have overwhelmed them. The result would be that other IAF teams would tend to get trigger-happy, raising the possibilities of civilian casualties. In an area where human intelligence is minimal and terrain preventing easy distinguishing of Naxal patrols and foraging tribals, this would have serious consequences.

There is also the issue of setting up Army camps and training sessions in Naxal strongholds. True, a sovereign country will not be dictated by presence of guerrilla groups when it comes to training and deployment of its forces. Though there has been no untoward incident so far, there is a high probability of the Army getting dragged into the conflict.

The Naxals are no fools to attack army personnel or camps and bring on themselves the wrath of a well-trained and heavily-armed force. However, if a communication gap or a case of mistaken identity results in such an attack – and casualties – things are going to get ugly.

The Army would get involved in the direct action and soon the conflict would snowball into a full-fledged civil war. And when such a conflict takes place it always tends to take a heavy toll on lives (uniformed and civilian) and scars the region’s psyche — and that is something nobody wants.

The government agencies should shake off their lethargy and revisit standard operating procedures (SOPs) so that the forces (police and the military) are in a better position to deal with delicate situations like the one faced by the IAF personnel in Chhattisgarh.

(This article was published as the editorial column in Postnoon on February 6, 2013.)

NCTC split will cripple counter-terror ops

‘United to protect’ is the motto of the National Counterterrorism Center of the United States which was formed in 2003 to co-ordinate national and international counter-terrorism efforts of the country in the wake of 9/11.
However, ‘united’ would be an oxymoron if used in the motto for its Indian counterpart of the same name — thanks to the states which put their ‘autonomy’ before a threat that does not discriminate between the Union or states.
The contention of the states is that a Central body that operates independently and to which all official machinery of the states have to extend co-operation is an infringement on their longstanding monopoly on the ‘law and order’ segment. In their rush to preserve their autonomy, the states are forgetting that trying to put terrorism under law and order is like trying to control a tyrannosaurus rex with a dog leash.
Whether the ever-politically-correct intelligentsia of the country agrees to call them terrorists or not, we are faced with dozens of forms of terrorism across the country.
From the Maoists who have killed thousands of civilians and security personnel to religious/ cultural fundamentalists who kill, maim and strip people of their dignity, the population is being subject to terrorism that takes away the Constitution-guaranteed rights of the citizens.
Over the years, the states have shown a continuing trend of forgetting the bigger picture of national security and giving in to populism — usually based on vote-bank politics.
Though the activists who campaign against death penalty may differ, the sheer lack of political cojones to execute terrorists who have been convicted of role in plots to assassinate national/ state leaders and facilitating attack on Parliament may die of old age if the present indecisiveness continues.
If it is coalition concerns from the south that extends life for some, it’s minority vote bank that proves the saviour for another, a third is being kept alive owing to resurgence in his community’s new-found belief in his innocence.
One way or the other, regional sentiments have proven detrimental to sending out a clear message on perpetrators of terrorism. Despite national counter-terror and investigation agencies unearthing evidence of Hidutva outfits in terror attacks, the political leaders are too scared to call it ‘saffron terror’ for fear of alienating their vote bank. The lack of spine to call a spade a spade is an inherent disgusting feature of our leaders who are more concerned about attaining and sustaining power than national interests.
After the 26/11 attacks the country’s security apparatus went into an overhaul, especially the coastal security. In a recently-held security drill to test the preparedness of the system, three ‘terrorist teams’ managed to evade all the preventive mechanisms and reach their ‘targets’. This clearly shows that we have miles to go before claiming to have a foolproof system in place.
One major reason for the limited success of counter-terror measures is the time lost in the maze of procedures and clearances. When more parties are involved in intelligence sharing, the likelihood of leaks and failed operations too increase.
For example, Maoists have deeply penetrated several states’ administrative cadre and police forces. If information on planned operations is shared with the administration in advance, the result would be jeopardising the mission with the inevitable result of massive loss of life for the security forces.
Across the world, the security interests of the country are given priority over the autonomy of the federating units and it should be no different in the case of India too. The current rebellion of dissenting chief ministers is like limbs seeking a consultative process on action when someone’s about to smash the head.
(This article was published as the editorial column in Postnoon on April 18, 2012)