Time to streamline anti-Naxal ops

Two Central ministries, ministry of defence (MoD) and ministry of home affairs (MHA), are engaged in a nasty war of words over an incident involving Indian Air Force personnel during an anti-Maoist operation in Chhattisgarh.

An IAF Mi-17 that was providing logistical support to the police was brought down by Naxal fire. The MHA lashed out at the “cowardice” of the IAF personnel who, reportedly chose to abandon the machine and the wounded man where the chopper landed and flee to the nearest camp. The rescue party and reinforcements reached the spot three hours later.

The IAF also came under fire because its personnel did not bother to leave behind its commandos to guard the chopper and the injured cop — leaving the machine and its load of weapons unguarded in the Naxal-infested territory for three long hours.

The Air Force, in its defence, said the blame lay on the state’s police which did not ‘sanitise’ the area near their camp.

While the blame game continues and respective departmental inquiries are on, the uncomfortable issue of (and the ambiguity regarding) the role of the armed forces in anti-Naxal operations has raised its head.

The MoD had earlier declared that its personnel (read IAF) can return fire if fired upon by the Maoists guerrillas. It has not emerged clearly why the armed helicopter, with highly trained commandos on board, could not respond to the attack and went down.

The IAF personnel, before scramming, left an LMG and a pistol with the wounded policeman — how noble!

May be, in that condition, he was supposed to do a Rambo and mow down any possible Naxal assault team.

Now, imagine a scenario if the chopper crew had decided to hold their position. No matter what their training, the sheer numerical superiority of a Naxal party would have overwhelmed them. The result would be that other IAF teams would tend to get trigger-happy, raising the possibilities of civilian casualties. In an area where human intelligence is minimal and terrain preventing easy distinguishing of Naxal patrols and foraging tribals, this would have serious consequences.

There is also the issue of setting up Army camps and training sessions in Naxal strongholds. True, a sovereign country will not be dictated by presence of guerrilla groups when it comes to training and deployment of its forces. Though there has been no untoward incident so far, there is a high probability of the Army getting dragged into the conflict.

The Naxals are no fools to attack army personnel or camps and bring on themselves the wrath of a well-trained and heavily-armed force. However, if a communication gap or a case of mistaken identity results in such an attack – and casualties – things are going to get ugly.

The Army would get involved in the direct action and soon the conflict would snowball into a full-fledged civil war. And when such a conflict takes place it always tends to take a heavy toll on lives (uniformed and civilian) and scars the region’s psyche — and that is something nobody wants.

The government agencies should shake off their lethargy and revisit standard operating procedures (SOPs) so that the forces (police and the military) are in a better position to deal with delicate situations like the one faced by the IAF personnel in Chhattisgarh.

(This article was published as the editorial column in Postnoon on February 6, 2013.)